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 The Cabrini-Green Housing project in Chicago, IL, was constructed primarily during the 
“urban renewal” movement of the early 1950s. Urban renewal typically involved demolishing 
properties within a slum and building new housing on that land. One of the byproducts of urban 
renewal was the advent of high-rise, high-occupancy housing for low-income persons. 
Unfortunately, these high-rise dwellings were typically low-quality, amounting to large 
maintenance costs. As time passed, huge projects like Cabrini-Green, occupied by 15,000 
residents, required huge sums to maintain yet still could not consistently fill vacancies. The high 
concentration of low- and very low-income persons, coupled with building deterioration, led to 
increased gang activity and, as a result, increased violence and drug use.  
The cycle continued throughout the ‘60s, ‘70s, ‘80s, and early ‘90s.1 In 1989, the 
National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing was established by Congress to fix 
the issues presented by high-density, very low-income housing projects like Cabrini-Green. The 
report concluded that 6% of the public housing units in the United States were “severely 
distressed” to the point where the units were uninhabitable; the results of this deterioration were 
“increasing levels of poverty, inadequate and fragmented services…, institutional abandonment,” 
and a high amount of blight.2  Department of Housing and Urban Development planned the 
Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) Program to remedy the 
effects of “severely distressed” housing. Thus, HOPE VI became an aggressive initiative 
designed to accomplish “revitalization of severely distressed developments by investing in 
people, buildings, and neighborhoods.”3 In 1993, the first HOPE VI Notice of Funds Availability 
1 "“Estimating the Public Costs.” Urban Institute. Pg. Short history of“Estimating the Public Costs.” Urban Institute. 
Pg.  Cabrini-Green « west north." West North. <http://westnorth.com/2003/01/02/short-history-of-cabrini-green/>. 
2 “HOPE VI Progress and Problems in Revitalizing Distressed Public Housing.” United States General Accounting 
Office. July 1998. Pg. 2. 
3 “Interim Assessment of the HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report.” Office of Policy Development and Research, 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. September 2003. Pg i. 
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(NOFA) was issued. In 1994, a HOPE VI grant awarded funds to the Chicago Housing Authority 
explicitly to redevelop Cabrini-Green; although not completed, this revitalization initiative, along 
with the majority of other HOPE VI grant awardees, has produced mixed-to-positive results.  
  HOPE VI is a radical departure from the antiquated “urban renewal” philosophy of 
public housing. Urban renewal was first introduced by the Housing Act of 1949, allowing cities 
to receive federal funding for housing provided that their local housing agency concentrate funds 
on clearing slum land and constructing public housing. Most cities focused on maximizing 
occupancy and minimizing cost such that the “net result of this policy was…reinforcing 
segregation by tearing down poor neighborhoods and replacing them with high-density housing 
‘projects.’”4 Urban renewal projects, as a result, exacerbated the problem of slums by 
concentrating poverty in fewer areas. The concentration of poverty caused viable economic 
opportunities in the area to decrease. With only low-income residents, it is unlikely that a 
resident of the community will be able to afford opening a new business, leaving businesses to 
be predominantly owned by persons outside of the community. Chuck Matthei of the 
Community Land Trust commented on this trend when discussing the gap in ownership found in 
areas with high concentrations of poverty, “Examine the economy of most low-income 
communities and you will find far more money flowing than one might suspect. The problem is 
that what flows in flows right back out.”5 In effect, the community is facilitating the economic 
sustainability of the communities where the business owners live. Spending within their own, 
more affluent communities wherein the land and businesses are more likely to be owned by other 
community members bolsters the long-term economic sustainability of the community by 
4 Gillham, Oliver, and Alex S. MacLean.The limitless city: a primer on the urban sprawl debate. Washington, DC: 
Island Press, 2002. Print. Pg 136 
5 Cryan, Philip. "The City Belongs to All of Us | On the Commons." On the Commons. 
<http://onthecommons.org/city-belongs-all-us>. 
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increasing the wealth of its members, creating an friendly environment for new businesses that, 
once relocated, continue to concentrate investment in their neighborhoods while poor 
communities remain stagnant.  
New employment opportunities, therefore, arise outside of the poverty-concentrated 
areas, increasing the transportation costs of the residents. Without new employment 
opportunities, the area becomes less desirable for mid and high-income families, causing demand 
for residences to fall, lowering rent prices. Lower rent prices allow for even more low-income 
persons to inhabit the area, furthering the drain of funds and stifling the possibility of economic 
growth. The lack of legal employment in the neighborhood increases the demand for illegal 
employment opportunities: drugs, prostitution, and, resultantly, crime become mainstays. With 
Cabrini-Green, for example, gangs started to use the project as the hub for their illicit activities. 
High crime further decreases the area’s desirability. Furthermore, without sufficiently high tax 
revenues, fewer improvements were able to be made to the schools, public spaces, and other 
infrastructure. The cycle of poverty, with public housing of this type, has no option other than to 
continue, allowing for greater discrepancies between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” 
At first, HOPE VI was constructed in a manner similar to that of Urban Renewal in that 
the projects were to be all public-housing units, but as HOPE VI aged, it became revolutionary. 
HOPE VI aimed to correct flawed public housing philosophy by incorporating two ideologies: 
defensible space and New Urbanism. Defensible space was a theory created by Oscar Newman, 
hypothesizing that large, high-density apartment complexes were fodder for increased crime 
rates. Newman analyzed low-cost housing projects in New York City and found that, holding all 
other factors constant, the number of stories in a low-income housing project directly influenced 
the crime rate in the building’s vicinity. His theory of defensible space focused on four aspects 
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that would engender a reduction in crime rate: image, territoriality, and surveillance.6 Image is 
the physical presence of the area; Newman hypothesized that well-kempt buildings and public 
areas would reduce the stigma of the area and foster a sense of ownership in the residents such 
that they feel responsible for maintaining its beauty, reducing vandalism and other petty crimes. 
Tall, high-density buildings, Newman said, limit the frequency and intensity of neighborly 
relationships, thus, an individual will be unable to feel as if their residence is a home that should 
be protected against outsiders. Territoriality supposes that smaller buildings with fewer 
inhabitants will create a community of inhabitants willing to defend their home and their 
neighbors, allowing for tactile barrier of a building’s walls to join with the symbolic barrier of 
territory. Tall buildings obscure views, and large numbers of tall buildings decrease open spaces; 
therefore, smaller buildings and more open spaces will reduce the area wherein crime is 
unobservable to reduce crime frequency and ability to evade legal repercussions for criminal 
acts. Essentially, Newman’s theory of defensible space is that domiciles should be designed such 
that its inhabitants are connected to the space and invested in its continued protection in contrast 
to the anonymity that large housing complexes cultivate. 
New Urbanism promotes the ideology that quality of life will improve in a neighborhood 
that emphasizes walkability of a neighborhood, connectivity of street grid, mixed-use 
development integrating housing and commercial properties, diversity of inhabitant composition 
in race and income, housing varying in type and size, quality architecture, urban design 
emphasizing aesthetics, traditional neighborhood structure via a town center, proliferation of 
public and open spaces, increased density, public transportation, and environmental 
6 Remy, Melissa. "Ocsar Newman's Theory of Defensible Space." Florida State University. 
<http://criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/newman.htm> 
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sustainability.7 Many of its tenets overlap with or are derived from the theory of defensible 
space, specifically the necessity of open, public spaces and spawning a sense of community, and 
resultantly responsibility for the trajectory of the community, in its residents. Compared with 
Urban Renewal housing conceptions, New Urbanism’s important deviation from that philosophy 
is their belief that communities should be of mixed-income persons, correcting the problem of 
community divestment and the propagation of crime within areas with high concentrations of 
poverty. Mixed-use edifices also ensure that individuals live, work, and spend within a small 
geographic area, promoting long-term sustainability of local business. 
HOPE VI, although seemingly a marked improvement from previous housing 
philosophies, still contained flaws. Many critics opined that HOPE VI’s onus on taxpayers far 
outweighed the palpable benefits of the program. Most analyses of the effects of HOPE VI are 
incomplete as the program is too recent to be able to draw substantive meaning from its long-
term results. Preliminary data, coupled with criticisms from organizations like the National Low 
Income Housing Coalition, showed that, while HOPE VI exuded promise, it did not fully deliver. 
The flaws of HOPE VI were such that its funding ceased after the fiscal year 2010 such that it 
could be replaced by the Choice Neighborhoods Program. The Choice Neighborhoods Program 
incorporating many of HOPE VI’s premises, including the central credo that “mixed-income, 
economically integrated neighborhoods improve the lives of residents and aid the surrounding 
community.”8 In order to gauge the efficacy of HOPE VI, the program must be evaluated by its 
progress on its stated goals: “(1) transform public housing communities from islands of despair 
7 "New Urbanism." New Urbanism. <http://www.newurbanism.org/>. 
8 “Evidence Matters| Transforming Knowledge Into Housing and Community Policy Development Winter 2011” 
Office of Policy Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Winter 2011. 
                                                          
Eitches 6 
 
and poverty into vital and integral parts of larger neighborhoods and (2) create environments that 
encourage and support the movement of individuals and families toward self-sufficiency.”9 
The first goal necessitates that HOPE VI grants be dispersed in a quick and efficient 
manner such that on-site improvements may begin. There are four types of HOPE VI grants: 
demolition, revitalization, Main Street, and planning. Demolition grants, awarded from 1996 
through 2003, went toward the demolition of over 57,000 “severely distressed” public housing 
units for a grand total of $395 billion.10 Revitalization grants, operating from 1993 to the end of 
the program in 2010, funded public housing development and modernization; 262 grants were 
given to municipal housing authorities, amounting to $6.2 billion over the duration of the 
program.11 Revitalization grants also include Section 8 vouchers, literacy programs, and other 
improvements made underneath the second tenet of HOPE VI. Main Street grants funded 
initiatives that preserved the “traditional and historic character” of the neighborhoods affected by 
HOPE VI; Main Street grants were still awarded for FY 2012 despite the end of the HOPE VI.12 
Planning grants, conferred between 1993 and 1995, were the primitive form of Demolition 
grants; demolition grants widened the scope of the activities permitted under planning grants. 
Capital costs, as a requirement of the HOPE VI NOFA, must account for at least 80% of HOPE 
VI funds while social services may not account for greater than 20% of grant funds. 
9 Gayle Epp, “Emerging Strategies for Revitalizing Public Housing Communities,” Housing Policy Debate, Vol 7, 
No. 3 (1996), pp. 563-88. 
10 "Demolition Grants - HOPE VI ."HUD/U.S.. Web. 
<http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/hope6/grants/dem
olition> 
11 “HOPE VI REVITILIZATION GRANTS As Originally Awarded.” Department of Housing and Urban 
Development. <http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_10014.pdf> 
12 “Main Street Grants - HOPE VI. "HUD/U.S.. Web. 
2011. <http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/hope6/grant
s/mainstreet> 
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HOPE VI allocated more dollars-per-unit to public housing than in the past. A larger 
allocation means that taxpayer dollars created fewer units, but those units will last for endure and 
be attractive housing for longer periods of time than typical public housing, incurring lower 
maintenance costs. Still, it proved difficult for many HOPE VI grants to reach the construction 
phase in a timely manner. For the first two fiscal years of HOPE VI’s authorization, no grants 
allocated to the municipal housing authorities had been dispersed as planning a large scale 
upheaval of a dilapidated housing project consumes a significant amount of time. As such, in 
March 1998, only 27% of the grants made during the first three fiscal years of the program had 
been dispersed.13 But, as the program aged, the expenditures became timelier: by September 
2002, 44% of HOPE VI funds granted had been dispersed.14 Furthermore, by 2003, only 43% of 
the planned units deriving funding from grants bestowed between 1993 and 1997 had been 
completed.15 Many, including President Bush and his Secretary of HUD Mel Martinez, 
harangued that the length of time between award and development, although an improvement 
from the preliminary years of the program, were nevertheless too great to warrant future 
Congressional authorization of funds. To address slow progress, the FY 2002 NOFA required 
project readiness to be a factor in determining funding allocation. 
The inability to produce units in a timely fashion was exacerbated by the inadequacies of 
the participating municipal housing authorities. At least 70% of grants awarded between 1993 
and 1999 did not submit their overall plans on time; most grantees missed their construction 
deadlines.16 Cabrini-Green’s new construction was delayed for years as a result of the Chicago 
Housing Authority’s inability to suitably create and implement plans. Chicago Housing 
13 “HOPE VI Progress and Problems” GAO. Pg 6. 
14 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg ii 
15 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 21 
16 “HOPE VI Progress and Problems”  GAO.Pg 9. 
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Authority was not the only municipal housing authority to have issues; not coincidentally, the 
properties with the utmost amount of blight, the ones addressed first by the program and the 
earliest grantees, were under the dominion of “agencies with histories of management 
problems.”17  
Poor management before HOPE VI resulted in the deterioration of public housing. 
Realizing this, only a handful of municipal housing authorities have all of the management 
responsibility during the HOPE VI process; most are partially or entirely managed by private 
firms. This change in management was a result of the Mixed-Finance rule of 1996, allowing 
municipal housing authorities to use HOPE VI and other HUD grants to leverage  private and 
public funds and further allowed a third party to receive public housing capital funds from the 
housing authorities.18 The deregulation of public housing by the federal government resulted in 
“a more entrepreneurial, market-driven culture in public housing management” with “substantial 
emphasis on developing public/private partnerships among housing authorities, private sector 
developers, and management firms.”19 Whereas early in HOPE VI’s trajectory, the goal was to 
alleviate simply the site of the blighted housing, after the 1996 rule, HOPE VI changed its 
breadth to include overall community redevelopment, specifically through creating mix-income 
communities. The private investors in these mixed-income communities advocated for more 
amenities such that they could command a higher market-rate; for the public housing in those 
communities, the quality increased without a significant increase in HOPE VI grants. These 
private-public initiatives allowed for construction to continue predominantly uninterrupted 
despite the duress of annual ebb-and-flow of HOPE VI allocation funds. As the program aged, its 
17 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg vii. 
18 “A Decade of HOPE VI: Research Findings and Policy Challenges.” Urban Institute. May 2004. Pg 24. 
19 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 16. 
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ability to leverage funds increased: 1997 grantees were able to leverage 22% of its funds from 
non-HOPE VI sources while 2001 grantees leveraged 59%. In 2002, 79% of leveraged funds 
were from other federal sources, calling into doubt the real ability of HOPE VI to leverage funds 
from the private sector; alternatively, each year of HOPE VI amounted in a greater amount of 
leveraged funds from other sources per dollar of HOPE VI funding, reaching $2.63 additional 
leverage dollars in the private sector per HOPE VI dollar for 2001 grantees.20 
Despite increases in leveraged funds, an argument can be made that HOPE VI is not an 
efficient use of taxpayer dollars; after all, less units were constructed for more dollars. 
Conversely, HOPE VI costs taxpayers less than were the dilapidated developments left standing: 
per year, demolition of a blighted property to create mixed-income housing reduces housing 
subsidy costs by $3.9 million while simultaneously increasing the expected local property tax 
revenues of the neighboring area by $492,000.21 Likewise, HOPE VI results in a decrease of 
60% in the annual per-unit capital costs.22 Unlike Urban Renewal programs that operated 
partially for “negro removal” for the purposes of concentrating African-Americans in one place, 
HOPE VI has successfully made areas typically redlined by financial institutions attractive to 
lenders because of the reduction of risk for investment ventures in HOPE VI areas.23 
A consequence of increased investor interest is an unambiguous increase in land values 
near HOPE VI sites such that a reduction in affordable housing occurs. HOPE VI’s mixed-
income housing initiatives results in chosen revitalization sites that will be able to yield a 
20 “PUBLIC HOUSING Information on the Financing, Oversight, and Effects of the HOPE VI Program.” United 
States General Accounting Office. June 2007. Pg  6. 
21 “Estimating the Public Costs and Benefits of HOPE VI Investments: Methodological Report.” Urban Institute. 
June 2007. Pg. 2 
22 “Estimating the Public Costs.” Urban Institute. Pg. 29 
23 Sink, Todd. “Assessment and Impact of Gentrified Public Housing Neighborhoods in the United States” Indiana 
State University. August 2011. Pg 15. 
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sufficient demand for the private, higher-rent units. Critics of HOPE VI pronounce this to be an 
unequivocal indication of the intent of the government to gentrify inner cities. Whereas HOPE 
VI is intended to be a program to ease the burden for low- and very-low income persons, 
opponents argue that it consequently “reduces housing for poor people while creating more 
housing for wealthier people.”24 Thus, it is contended that HOPE VI’s impact on the poor, a 
predominately minority class, is as detrimental to the racist policies of Urban Renewal. Other 
critics maintain that HOPE VI mixed-income developments, because of their abundant amenities 
targeted at increasing its attractiveness to those above the lowest income echelon, will not reduce 
the per-unit subsidy of low-income units.25  
Studies have hypothesized that mixed-income communities “spur larger benefits for the 
surrounding neighborhood, bringing better public services, more shopping opportunities, and, in 
a few instances, new schools.”26 The ambit to which that corollary applies to HOPE VI is 
uncertain; many developments have not had ample time to mature to the point where long-term 
benefits are palpable. Yet, in the certain earlier HOPE VI sites, community infrastructure has 
undergone a conspicuous increase. An Atlanta site previously referred to as “The Void” is now 
the home to a new aquarium and multiple new market-rate condominium projects; a Charlotte 
community has been a bastion of new real estate development. In these two locations, the 
neighborhood’s poverty level dropped sharply; Atlanta saw a decrease from 72% to 44% while 
Charlotte experienced a reduction from 54% to 38%.27  The developer of a HOPE VI site in St. 
Louis, along with a real estate firm, St. Louis public schools, and a community development 
housing corporation built a state-of-the-art school complete with an Adult Computer Training 
24 Sink, Todd. “Assessment.” Pg 3. 
25 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 23. 
26 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 23. 
27“HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pgs xi-xii. 
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Lab for parents.28 Other sites have not experienced such improvement: a Camden site’s social 
and economic stress has not been ameliorated under the program, retaining its previous 
commercial enterprises of liquor, fast food, and convenience stores. In a sample of four HOPE 
VI mixed income developments, all reported an increase in median household income at a rate 
“significantly faster than elsewhere in the city or region,” greater workforce participation, a 
lower unemployment rate, greater number of investments, and that “HOPE VI redevelopments 
are responsible for the positive economic spillover to surrounding neighborhoods.”29 Still, sum 
economic improvements from HOPE VI are hard to assess as the Great Recession of 2007 
greatly affected almost every sector of the economy and because economic improvement is 
highly dependent on local market conditions. Furthermore, as HOPE VI projects vary from site 
to site, it is difficult to measure the improvements solely from HOPE VI versus improvements 
from the specific nuances of the HOPE VI site.  
One area where HOPE VI has achieved is in the effort to deconcentrate poverty. Of 11 of 
the earliest projects, about 65% of residents have a household income below 30% of the area 
median income; mixed income sites have lower rates of very-low income residents but higher 
numbers of working adults.30 In the instances where a former occupant of a “severely distressed” 
unit did not enter HOPE VI housing after construction, the program’s voucher aspect financed 
their relocation into better areas than prior.31 For new and returning inhabitants of HOPE VI 
sites, of both public-only and mixed-income character, the median income after revitalization 
was about 40% higher than the median income at the blighted sites. Discrepancies between new 
and returning residents were distinct in mixed-income housing: their new public housing 
28 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 42. 
29“ Evidence Matters.” HUD PD&R. Pg 3. 
30 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 33. 
31 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 14. 
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residents had incomes more than $3,000 greater per year than returning residents, a pattern not 
seen in public-only housing HOPE VI sites. A partial explanation is that 56% of those persons 
previously residing at the project versus 36% of new residents of the sites residents were over the 
age of 50 and, resultantly, had a household income less than that of younger-headed 
households.32 This reduction in poverty concentration is most evident in mixed-income sites 
wherein “non-public housing units” account for an average of 28% of all units; still, some 
occupants of non-public units receive Low Income Housing Tax Credits or other federal 
subsidies to acquire their domiciles.33 
Surprisingly, the change in income has not change the racial composition of HOPE VI 
sites dramatically. As the Urban Institute noted, “the net effect was that HOPE VI revitalization 
efforts almost exclusively affected minority residents and communities” because minority 
residents were those that “suffered the effects of living in the worst public housing, and the same 
residents later experienced the consequences – good and bad – of the changes HOPE VI brought 
about.”34 The racial composition of HOPE VI sites varied based on location and ability to attract 
mixed-income residents; nevertheless, 88% of persons living in the neighborhoods surrounding 
the sites were minorities. The percentage of white persons living in HOPE VI doubled from an 
average of 2% to 4% between 1990 and 2000 and from 4% to 7% between 2000 and 2007, but 
whites still do not account or a significant percentage of the population of the overall 
neighborhood.35 The upward trend is promising, though; it shows potential for HOPE VI to, over 
time, increase the racial diversity in the development with the potential for a significant effect in 
the overall community over time. 
32 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 38. 
33 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 40. 
34 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 8 
35 Sink, Todd. “Assessment.” Pg 65. 
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Nevertheless, it is irrefutable that HOPE VI projects are a perceptible physical 
improvement over the blighted projects of yesteryear regardless of whether the housing was new 
construction or rehabilitation, mixed-income or public housing only. In the new construction 
areas, principles of New Urbanism were able to be implemented with greater efficacy than at 
rehabilitation sites. A Ford Foundation Innovations grant was bestowed to the entire HOPE VI 
program in 2006 in recognition of their novel design schemes; individual HOPE VI sites have 
also received awards.36 Coincidentally, the most successful projects in terms of conferring 
benefits to the community were those incorporating New Urbanism principles, specifically the 
mixed-income locales.37 Improvements were not merely perceived by award distributors: 58% of 
all HOPE VI residents were “very satisfied” with their housing while 34% were “satisfied.”38 
All sites underwent physical changes of a reduction in density, grander interplay of 
sidewalks and street grids, and increased incorporation of designs that double as safety measures 
(like large bay windows, private entrances). Crime reduction was one of the most important 
aspects of HOPE V as many of the areas demolished for new HOPE VI developments were 
formerly perforated by crime and drugs. Defensible space ideology’s incorporation into the 
planning process, coupled with other measures, dramatically reduced the crime rate. In survey of 
residents in pre-HOPE VI revitalization locations, almost 75% of respondents stated that there 
were “major problems with drug trafficking and drug sales in their developments” while 66% 
reported “shootings and violence were also big problems” and 50% confessed that “they did not 
feel safe outside their own buildings.”39 HOPE VI developments, as indicated by preliminary 
studies, range from 9 to 41 crimes per 100 residents with mixed-income units having the lowest 
36 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 20 
37 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 71. 
38 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 74. 
39 “Estimating the Public Costs.” Urban Institute. Pg. 27. 
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incidences of crime. After HOPE VI, 74% of residents reporting feeling safe outside their homes; 
additionally, in most HOPE VI sites, the crime rate decrease at a greater magnitude than 
comparable areas with the city. In all HOPE VI sites, crime rates decreased after revitalization.40 
HOPE VI sites employed differing methods to curb crime: resident involvement in security, 
enlisting the services of local law enforcement, providing free or reduced rent for police officers 
living on site, private security services, and increasing proximity to a police station.41 
Although heralded for design, replacing high-occupancy towers with low-density 
complexes had some dire consequences. The elimination of the “one-for-one” replacement law 
for public housing, requiring one new unit to be built in place of one destroyed unit, benefited 
less monetarily endowed municipal housing authorities by enabling them to replace their decrepit 
housing within their fiscal constraints. Without the “one-for-one” requirement, HOPE VI was 
able to pursue New Urbanism concepts in a way unfeasible in the past; however, the decrease in 
population density coupled with emphasis on open spaces and lower building heights caused 
many of the occupants of the “severely distressed” housing to be displaced. HOPE VI’s mixed-
income initiatives cut the stock of units heavily subsidized for low incomes in half after 
revitalization; however, at least 1/3 of those units were vacant prior to the revitalization process 
such that 78% the number of units for very low income tenants occupied prior were replaced 
with HOPE VI.42 Additionally, HOPE VI’s general failure to transition from planning to 
demolition to construction in a timely manner also resulted in an unanticipated long-term 
displacement for previous residents. A large share of displaced residents accepted another form 
of HUD vouchers or subsidies while reconstruction proceeded; most relocated to lower poverty 
40 “Estimating the Public Costs.” Urban Institute. Pg. 204 
41 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 100 
42 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 21 
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neighborhoods with the assistance of vouchers. Almost all original residents, as the aftermath of 
their removal from “severely distressed” projects, relocated to a better community with safer, 
more sanitary units than before; about 40% of displaced residents not returning to the HOPE VI 
site relocated to areas with less than 20% poverty rates.43 Only 46% of HOPE VI public housing 
inhabitants at the time of the site’s opening lived on-site prior to revitalization; 41% of all 
inhabitants, non-public housing and public housing households, lived on-site prior to 
revitalization.44 As a large percentage of former residents indicated their desire to live in HOPE 
VI housing, the low retention rate of former inhabitants could be a consequence of fewer housing 
units or an inability to meet HOPE VI’s enhanced screening criteria.45 By 2011, 84% of families 
in five of the original HOPE VI sites had relocated elsewhere.46 It should be noted, though, that 
high turnover rates are typical for public housing; however, HOPE VI aimed at reducing 
turnover such that the “community” element of New Urbanism and defensible space could be 
achieved. 
The second part of HOPE VI’s mission, to “create environments that encourage and 
support the movement of individuals and families toward self-sufficiency,” is difficult to 
quantify yet, especially since the character of development residents changed during the 
transition from blight to HOPE VI. Emphasizing the immense bearing that support services have 
on the trajectory of a community, the Congress of New Urbanism stated that New Urbanism 
designs and planning cannot ameliorate the social and economic problems of neighborhood 
residents and public housing tenants alone as sufficient services are needed to ensure long-term 
viability and self-sufficiency. HOPE VI was innovative with its provision to provide support 
43 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 29 
44 “HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report” HUD. Pg 34 
45 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 29 
46“Evidence Matters.” HUD PD&R. Pg 5 
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services to improve the quality of life of its residents, accounting for a maximum 20% of grant 
funds. Without a set of standards, the number and comprehensiveness of afforded support 
services were determined at the discretion of the municipal housing authorities; moreover, this 
can have a wholly positive effect whence municipal housing authorities tailor services to meet 
the specific needs of the community. Unfortunately, other housing authorities, like the Chicago 
Housing Authority (CHA), have been notoriously inept at informing its residents about services 
and performing the services at an acceptable level. When the CHA was faced with relocating the 
residents of Cabrini-Green, among other “severely distressed” projects, they offered displaced 
residents brief clinics to educate about housing choices instead of individualized attention that 
would have ensured the best possible outcome for the counselee.47 Counterintuitively, the mixed-
income sites had more support services than public-only developments despite having less 
overall need: their use of outside funding fosters the ability to, for example, construct a 
community center that provides day-care services.  
Seattle’s “New Holly” HOPE VI site is exemplar in providing services that unequivocally 
influence the ambit of future self-sustainability. They have built a public library, garden space, 
community classrooms, family center, and parks while offering “community building activities 
intended to…serve the larger community.”48 Other sites have leveraged funds to build magnet 
and charter schools to educate the youth, a crucial expansion as quality education is the foremost 
indicator of future self-sustainability. GED support programs may have helped contribute to the 
increase of percentage of high school diploma holders for most HOPE VI sites. Furthermore, 
preliminary results show that “neighborhoods in which HOPE VI sites are located had 
experienced positive changes in income, employment, community investment, and crime 
47 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 37 
48“A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 38 
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indicators.”49 Likewise, another study showed an increase of 71% on average in per capita 
income for HOPE VI neighborhoods whereas cities in which the tested sites were located 
experienced a 14.5% increase during the same time frame (1989 to 1999).50 
In other areas, the picture of HOPE VI’s impact on self-sufficiency is not nearly as 
optimistic. One of the largest failures of HOPE VI, by the admission of a HUD report, is “its 
inability to address multi-faceted problems in residents’ lives, such as health issues and 
employment.”51 Over 30% of respondents to a HOPE VI Panel study indicated being afflicted 
with a chronic illness, 29% reported poor mental health, over 60% of older children had at least 
one reported instance of a behavioral problem, and a sixth experienced a depressive episode.52 
Obviously, it is almost impossible to attain or maintain viable employment if an individual is 
saddled with myriad of health issues or has family with such a burden. Job training programs are 
unquestionably invaluable in the plight for self-sufficiency; however, few HOPE VI sites had 
programs aimed at quelling the health problems of the residents.  
Some HOPE VI sites’ selective criterion for residents further impeded the move toward 
“self-sufficiently” by establishing eligibility rules including provisions on employment, criminal 
background, and substance abuse among others. By eliminating the “hard to house” from the 
benefits conferred by the HOPE VI program, the only families able to use the program to 
facilitate their march toward self-sufficiency those without large obstacles, like a history of 
substance abuse, blocking their path. HOPE VI, because of the number of “hard-to-house” 
previously located at the blighted sites, needed a program to address the displacement of this 
specific group of people. As “finding landlords in good neighborhoods has been one of the most 
49 “PUBLIC HOUSING” GAO. 2007. Pg, 11 
50 “PUBLIC HOUSING” GAO. 2007. Pg, 12 
51 “ Evidence Matters.” HUD PD&R. Pg 6 
52 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 34 
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persistent barriers” to housing for all displaced persons,53 the process is far more difficult and 
tenuous for the “hard-to-house.” Data on homelessness of this population as a consequence of 
housing displacement is unknown, but it is certain that a number of those persons are without 
any semblance of stable housing.  
Choice Neighborhoods is the answer to the question of “what-went-wrong” with HOPE 
VI. Although some will point to the high per-unit cost of HOPE VI or the possibility of 
gentrification as significant detractions to the program, the most important issues were located in 
the more social aspects of the program. Whereas HOPE VI succeeded in its primary goal of 
reducing blight, its supportive services were not sufficient, and it left far too many of the 
previous residents without the reparations they deserved for receiving dangerous, sub-par 
housing for countless years. The principles of New Urbanism and defensible space, at least 
within the limited data on returns to HOPE VI, are certainly effective in improving many aspects 
of the life of an individual in the community and fostering innovation; however, they do not 
address the prevailing issue of poor health for poor people. Choice Neighborhoods aims to 
leverage more private funds than HOPE VI, further reducing taxpayer onus, and providing an 
extensive network of services. The improvements in Choice Neighborhoods, it would appear, 
address the major shortcomings of HOPE VI, an ambitious and idealistic but flawed initiative. 
53 “A Decade” Urban Institute. Pg 35 
                                                          
